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Evaluating farmers’ preferences for provision of climate regulation 
services by UK farmlands: A Choice Experiment application 
 
Abstract. There has been considerable research interest towards the design of payments for 
ecosystem services schemes. This paper examines the scope of such schemes for the provision 
of climate regulation service by UK farmlands. The type of farm will have an important 
influence on the potential to impact climate regulation services and the effectiveness of 
alternative payment schemes. A Choice Experiment approach was applied to elicit farmers’ 
preferences for two potential payment scenarios, designed for two distinct farming types (arable 
and livestock). In order to take account of the variation in agricultural landscapes, the study was 
conducted at different locations covering the national extent of the UK. Latent Class models 
were used to analyse the farmers’ responses to investigate their preferences, heterogeneity in 
their preferences, and the willingness to accept compensation estimates. The Latent Class model 
supported a specification with three discrete classes. It was found that, in general, farmers have 
a strong aversion to drastic changes in land use management; however, it was also observed that 
relatively less restrictive and flexible schemes with appropriate compensation levels could 
encourage farmers to participate. Furthermore, the study reveals that socioeconomic 
characteristics like livestock units, farm income, age, and farm size proved to have significant 
effect on the behaviour of the farmers. A derivation of the carbon abatement costs provided a 
comparison of a carbon sequestration scheme to a technology based GHG emission mitigation 
scheme. The analysis suggested that the scheme involving agroecosystems for carbon 
sequestration designed for arable farmers proved to be a more cost-effective option. These 
results can aid in designing appropriate policy schemes for climate regulation in the UK, with 
possible implications for other ecosystem services as well.  
Keywords: Payments for Ecosystem Services, Climate regulation, Choice Experiment, 
Latent Class Model, Preference heterogeneity, Marginal Carbon Abatement Costs. 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Agricultural land accounts for 10-14% of global (Smith et al., 2007) and 7% for the UK’s GHG 
emissions (NFU, 2005). Arable land and grasslands are responsible for significant quantities of these 
emissions while livestock is considered to be major contributor of methane and nitrous oxide (Moran 
et al., 2010). Under the Climate Change Act, 2008, the UK government is committed to reduce 
national emissions by 80% of 1990 levels by 2050 (ibid). This mitigation can be achieved through 
changes in agricultural activities to reduce emissions and enhance carbon storage. Moorby et al. 
(2007) have suggested three approaches for GHG mitigation from agriculture; reduction in direct 
emissions both from arable land and livestock, enhancing carbon sequestration (in the soil and 
vegetation), and indirectly by avoiding emissions (e.g. by producing alternative energy sources). This 
suggests that there might be a scope for improving climate regulation service in the agriculture sector 
by designing targeted policy schemes to encourage the farmers to make appropriate changes in their 
land management activities.  
For agri-environmental policy assessments, monetary estimates of the costs and benefits for various 
measures and impacts are the basis for economic evaluations (Huber et al., 2011). Payment for 
Ecosystem services (PES) schemes are increasingly popular  policy instruments for improvement in 
ecosystem services which help to establish both improvements in the environment and in the welfare 
gains of ecosystem managers (Defra, 2010). PES schemes like agri-environment schemes are being 
used to enhance the efficiency of supply of associated ecosystem services (Sauer and Wossink, 2010) 
and are an important component of the EU agricultural policy in the UK. These agreements have 
attracted increasing global attention as they have changed ecosystem services into financial incentives 
for local land managers (Engel et al., 2008) by compensating them for any income loss or increase in 
costs for the part they play in providing the environmental goods.  
Research into effective implementation of PES schemes has identified that farmers’ decision to 
participate is of utmost importance to achieve the scheme objectives (Wilson, 1996) and has been 
termed an ‘indicator’ of scheme effectiveness  (Wilson and Hart, 2000). Hence, it is important to have 
an understanding of the motivations of farmers to participate in payment schemes. The Willingness to 
Accept (WTA) approach has been used for research towards PES schemes’ effectiveness as it 
provides an estimate of the lowest level of compensation land owners expect from implementing 
management changes according to payment scheme designs (e.g. Broch and Vedel, 2012; Espinosa-
Goded et al., 2009; Kaczan et al., 2011). These estimates enable an assessment of how farmers trade 
off different levels of attributes against per hectare payments (Espinosa-Goded et al., 2009) and can 
help to inform the design of payment schemes (Ruto and Garrod, 2009). 
Considerable interest has been taken towards the design and scope of PES schemes. Several studies 
have investigated the preferences of farmers for different scheme attributes. Identifying the factors 
affecting the farmers’ participation decision can help to both improve existing payment scheme 
designs or to develop new schemes more attractive for farmers. Investigation on scheme attributes 
(e.g.Broch and Vedel, 2012; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; Ruto and Garrod, 2009; Wilson, 1997) and  
heterogeneity in the farmers’ participation behaviour have been investigated by several studies (see 
Hudson and Lusk, 2004; Ruto and Garrod, 2009; Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; Wilson and Hart, 
2000). This heterogeneity in preferences has been linked to farm/farmer characteristics (please refer to 
Dupraz et al., 2003; Maynard and Paquin, 2004; Morris and Potter, 1995; Potter and Lobley, 1992; 
Thacher et al., 1997; Wunder et al., 2008.; Wynn et al., 2001). Others have addressed improvements 
in PES scheme designs by concentrating on farmers preferences for scheme attributes (Broch and 
Vedel, 2012; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; Ruto and Garrod, 2009; Tesfaye and Brouwer, 2012) 
utilising Choice Experiments (CE) technique and only a few have focused on European case studies 
(Broch and Vedel, 2012; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2009; Ruto and Garrod, 2009). 
However, none of these recently published studies have addressed farmers’ WTA requirements for 
climate regulation service. Given the need for designing such policy schemes, it is appropriate to 
investigate the payments that farmers would be willing to accept for making appropriate changes in 
their land use and land management. Therefore, this paper assesses the alternative designs of potential 
payment schemes specifically addressing provision of climate regulation by analysing the 
participation behaviour of UK farmland owners.  
Although understanding the drivers contributing towards enhancing environmental effectiveness can 
be useful to guide effective policy support, an evaluation of the costs associated with these policies is 
also important. This helps to make the programs cost-effective by enrolling lands which provide 
maximum benefit within an affordable budget. This presents a need for a robust approach to develop 
such cost budgets to ensure the effectiveness of policies.   
For carbon pricing, two major approaches have been used, the social cost of carbon (SCC) and 
marginal abatement costs of carbon (MACC). The SCC is the marginal damage cost of emissions and 
is estimated for every additional tonne of carbon emitted to the atmosphere (Watkiss and Downing, 
2008), while the MACC is the cost of mitigation of one tonne of carbon based on a mitigation 
measure or technology (Moran et al., 2008). The MACC approach is the preferred approach in the UK 
as the costs are based on existing activities and technologies (DECC, 2009). 
Although MACC have been calculated by various studies for individual measures (see Moran et al., 
2008), research for carbon costs for complete policy programs have been limited mostly to programs 
for carbon sequestration by forestry and afforestation (see Richards and Stokes, 2004). Hence, we 
attempt a more holistic approach to provide carbon abatement costs for whole policy alternatives for 
two hypothetical schemes for climate regulation in agricultural land. The study focuses on two 
hypothetical payment schemes simultaneously for both carbon sequestration and GHG mitigation and 
employs a Choice Experiment (CE) approach to investigate farmers’ preferences for key attributes of 
the two policy schemes. Furthermore, it presents a comparison of the potential carbon abatement costs 
of the two schemes.  
To the authors’ knowledge this is the first CE application to evaluate PES scheme design for farmers’ 
willingness to contribute towards enhancing climate regulation by agriculture as an environmental 
service specifically in the UK to complement studies for other environmental services (see Beharry-
Borg et al., 2012; Christie et al., 2007; Hanley et al., 1998b). It also attempts a more holistic approach 
to provide a comparison of two potential policy alternatives for carbon sequestration and GHG 
mitigation in terms of carbon abatement costs. This study helps to inform future policy design of 
payment schemes for enhancing climate regulation by: i) exploring the extent of heterogeneity for two 
potential payment policies and optimising the preferred scheme designs according to the preferences 
of the identified group of farmers who can potentially be attracted for participation in these schemes, 
ii) estimating the carbon abatement costs for policy schemes and compare the cost-effectiveness. 
  
2 Analytical framework and methods 
For this study a stated preference (SP) method was considered appropriate because it is based on 
hypothetical payment schemes and no revealed data is available. For further details on the use of SP 
methods please refer to (Bateman et al., 2002) , (Hanley et al., 2001), (Bennett and Adamowicz, 
2001), and (Campbell et al., 2009). CE was deemed preferable as it makes it possible to combine both 
qualitative and quantitative attributes in one design. This paper consists of two stages and is based on 
data collected from a CE survey. The first stage involved the estimations of utility coefficients for 
attributes of two potential policy schemes, while the second stage used the estimations of CE study to 
calculate the carbon abatement costs, to determine the cost-effectiveness of each scheme.  
We employ a conditional logit (CL) model, accounting for different socio-demographic characteristics 
of the farmers and a latent class (LC) model with finite classes for individual segment-specific utility 
parameters. This helps to provide a better understanding of the underlying preferences (Ruto and 
Garrod, 2009) of farmers. The WTA estimates were calculated from these two models and the 
individual specific compensations were then utilised for the carbon cost analysis. The two analytical 
stages are described in the following subsections. 
 
2.1 Choice Experiment and econometric model 
Payment schemes are assumed to not only induce utility losses to farmers due to restricting farm 
management activities but also provide them with a monetary benefit for abiding by the scheme 
conditions. It can be posited that a farmer ‘n’ will choose to participate in a scheme alternative ‘i’ 
among j alternatives, if the net utility ‘Uni’ from it is greater than the status quo or other alternatives. 
The overall utility from a contract can be expressed as;  
                                      (1) 
Where Uni is the utility derived from that scenario, Xi is a vector of the attributes that make up the PES 
program and Zi is a vector of the farmer n characteristics.  
The utility that an individual derives from an alternative is considered to be associated with its 
attributes. So the utility function has a corresponding indirect utility function, Vni, which has a 
deterministic component vni and an unobservable component, εni, and is presented as: 
               (2) 
In logit models it is assumed that εni is an independently and identically distributed extreme value 
(Train, 2003) and does not depend on underlying parameters or data. 
The probability Pni that farmer n chooses alternative i over alternative j, can be expressed as the 
probability that the utility associated with alternative i is greater than that associated with all the other 
alternatives:  
                                  (3) 
 
2.1.1 Conditional logit model (CLM) 
First a conditional logit model (CLM) was used to estimate the influence of scheme characteristics on 
the likelihood of participation. CLM is the most commonly used and simplest of all the choice 
models. The utility for CLM, including a constant term to capture the effect that unobserved 
influences exert over the selection of the ‘business as usual’ or ‘do not want to participate’ option, 
becomes: 
                                        (4) 
The ASCBAU is a dummy variable that takes a value of 0 if one of the hypothetical payment 
programmes is selected by a respondent on a particular choice card or 1 if the ‘do not want to 
participate’ option is selected.  
The CLM assumes that unobservable components are identically, independently distributed and 
follow a Gumbel distribution (Hensher et al., 2005; Train, 2003). Therefore, the probability of 
selecting the alternative i will be: 
    
                           
                             
 
   
    (5) 
Where βk is the utility coefficient and Xkni is the level of attribute k for attribute i for a farmer n.  
The CLM framework imposes homogenous preferences across respondents which is considered to be 
a limitation as the preferences can be heterogeneous (Birol et al., 2006). Accounting for this 
heterogeneity is important in a policy context (Garrod et al., 2012) because the target group for a 
particular policy initiative may have varying socioeconomic characteristics and attitudes, implying 
differences in individual decision making. For identifying this preference heterogeneity the Latent 
Class model (LCM) was used. 
 
2.1.2 Latent Class model (LCM) 
Latent class model (LCM) captures taste heterogeneity between different classes, each latent class 
being unique and thus accounting for taste variation across the population. The latent class model 
classifies the respondents into segments and predicts their choice behaviour according to the segment 
they belong to. The number of segments is determined endogenously by the data (Birol et al., 2006). 
The selection of appropriate model, with a certain number of classes, should be based on the ability to 
provide interpretative simplicity, satisfy statistical criteria for model fit along with analyst’s 
judgement (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002; Scarpa and Thiene, 2005; Swait, 1994). 
The LCM is specified as a random utility model where farmer n belongs to latent class s= (1, 2…, S). 
The utility function can now be expressed as: 
                       (6) 
Where,     comprises of the attributes that appear in the utility functions and βs is a segment specific 
parameter vector while       represents the random variation for the farmer n. The probability that the 
farmer n belonging to segment s will choose alternative i is given by: 
       
      
        
    (7) 
In order to predict the individual’s segment membership, an unobservable latent segment membership 
likelihood function is used: 
   
     
                    (8) 
Where,    denotes a vector of individual and   
  is a segment specific parameter vector; and     is a 
stochastic error term. The error terms are assumed to be distributed independently across segments 
and individuals (Swait, 1994). The LCM then estimates joint probability to account for both choice 
and segment membership, Pnis =       . Wns. Therefore, the marginal probability of observing farmer 
n in segment s choosing alternative i is given by: 
       
     
       
  
   
   
    
    
        (9) 
Where the probability of selecting alternative i is equal to the sum over all latent classes s of the class-
specific membership model conditional on the product of class Pni|s, and  the probability of belonging 
to that class Wns  (Swait, 1994). 
The model estimations were carried out using Limdep 9.0 Nlogit 4.0. 
 
2.1.3 Marginal Willingness to Accept (WTA) estimations 
The WTA was estimated for each attribute of both policy schemes by taking the ratio of an attribute’s 
parameter coefficients to the marginal utility of the payment attribute.  This provides the marginal rate 
of substitution between the attribute and money (Hanemann, 1994).  
Individual-specific conditional estimates of minimum WTA for a specific change in a particular land 
management attribute can be estimated using: 
               
 
    
      
       
      (10) 
Where,      is the estimated matrix of individual specific posterior probabilities of segment (s) 
membership, and the ratio  
       
       
  is the implicit price for the attribute change, being valued, using 
the parameter coefficients from the relevant latent class segment. 
 
2.2 Carbon Abatement Cost 
The carbon costs were calculated using a MACC approach where carbon emissions are taken to be 
abated in line with the adoption of the two potential policy scenarios (see Section 3.1). The carbon 
abatement costs were estimated by calculating annual changes in potential equilibrium carbon stocks 
and the changes in annual emission (flows) of GHGs and combining them with WTA estimations 
from the CE study. The GHGs included in the analysis are carbon dioxide (CO2 - from land use 
change) and methane (CH4 - from livestock manure) which were converted to CO2 equivalents (CO2e).   
The individual per hectare payments multiplied with the total farm size provide the marginal cost of 
enrolling an additional farm into the scheme. Using the marginal abatement cost approach the carbon 
costs for each participating farm n were calculated as: 
        
      
       
      (11) 
Where CCostn is the annual cost of carbon (Pound Stirling per tonne of carbon equivalents), MCostn is 
the marginal cost of measure (WTA estimates for individual farm), and CAbaten is the potential 
carbon abated if the policy scenario is applied to that farm.  
The potential carbon emissions for the mitigation policy scheme were calculated from livestock 
manure only, because the scheme requires the farmers to use the manure as a feedstock for the 
digestion plants. These were calculated by multiplying the number of livestock with the emissions 
factors for each animal (Table 1). The data for per head estimates of GHG from livestock manure 
were based on UK-species specific emission factors from Jackson et al. (2009). 
 
Table 1: Data for calculation of emissions per head of livestock 
Livestock Emissions (tCO2e/ha/yr) 
Dairy 0.41 
Cattle 0.17 
Pigs 0.04 
Source: Jackson et al. (2009) 
 
The carbon abatement costs for the carbon sequestration policy were calculated for land use 
management activities and data from Warner et al. (2008) (Table 2). The carbon storage in terms of 
soil organic carbon (SOC) and biomass carbon (BIOC) were calculated for every additional measure 
required by the scheme. Therefore, the carbon storage for restrictive grazing was calculated by 
calculating the difference of carbon stored while moving from intensive to restrictive grazing and 
were then combined with the restrictive grazing estimates for the additional area of land converted to 
grassland. Similarly, for potential carbon storage for conservation tillage was calculated for only the 
land left after enrolment for the required level of change.  
 
Table 2: Data for calculation of land use change emissions 
Land use 
activity 
Conversion of arable land BIOC 
storage for 
Intensive 
grazing 
BIOC for 
Extensive 
grazing 
SOC for 
Conservation 
till 
arable  to 
grassland 
afforestation 
of arable 
land 
SOC BIOC SOC BIOC 
Emissions 
(tCO2e/ha/yr) 
3.32 0.73 3 2.2 5.9 8.8 0.7 
Source: Warner et al. (2008) 
3 Choice experiment design and application 
This section provides a brief description of the hypothetical payment scenarios and the attributes that 
were selected for these scenarios with an overview of the experimental design. 
 
3.1 Payment scheme scenarios and experimental design 
The  attributes for the policy schemes were chosen after a thorough literature review and were 
intended to be realistic and to represent possible future values if policy measures were to be 
implemented (Bennett and Blamey, 2001). The levels were used to represent each attribute according 
to the extent and scale of the improvement the farmers are willing to carry out. The two schemes were 
designed by categorising the farmlands into two major categories, livestock farms and arable farms, 
with six attributes each.  
The mitigation policy scheme, predominantly applicable for livestock farms, required the respondents 
to develop anaerobic digestion
1
 (AD) plant and use the manure from the livestock as the feedstock. In 
return generated energy can be used not only for farm energy requirements but surplus can be 
exported to the national grid. The scheme also included an attribute representing the option of either 
managing the plant by themselves or have it managed by a power supply company and share the 
benefits. On the other hand the sequestration policy scheme for arable farms offered a natural course 
of carbon sequestration through changes in land management activities. This required farmers to 
convert a certain percentage of land to permanent grasslands and for afforestation, changes in grazing 
times and ploughing methods. The attributes for both the schemes and their levels are explained in 
Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
1 These digesters are quite advantageous in improving the utilisation of livestock slurry, producing a soil-
friendly fertilizer and using renewable energy on the farm rather than importing energy (Bywater, 2011).  
Table 3: Description of attributes and levels for the two payment scheme scenarios 
Attributes Description (units) Attributes Levels Coding 
Mitigation Scenario 
Generator capacity The capacity of the plant to 
generate electricity 
(kW/MW) 
GCAP 20, 50, 1, 2 Linear 
specification 
Distance The distance of the plant 
from the farm (km) 
DIST <1, ~5, 10, 15 Linear 
specification 
Technical 
Assistance/training 
Would like provision of 
technical assistance/training 
TECH No, Yes Dummy, 
 No=0, Yes=1 
Length of agreement The minimum contract 
length they prefer (years) 
LOA 2, 5, 10, 20 Linear 
specification 
Plant ownership Suitable option of receiving 
the benefits and ownership 
of the plant 
 OWN Own the plant, 
to have it 
managed by a 
power company  
Dummy, Own=0     
power 
company=1 
Compensation Compensation payments 
(£/ha) 
COMP 10, 25, 50, 75 Linear 
specification 
Sequestration Scenario 
Enrolment for 
permanent grassland 
Area of land to enrol for 
conversion to grassland (%) 
PGRASS 10, 15, 30, 50 Linear 
specification 
Enrolment for 
afforestation 
Area of land to enrol for 
afforestation (%) 
AFOR 2, 5, 10, 15 Linear 
specification 
Grazing time  Grazing time period GRAZ Intensive 
grazing, 
Extensive 
grazing 
Dummy, 
Intensive=0 
Extensive=1 
Ploughing methods Ploughing method PLOUGH Conventional till, 
Conservation till 
Dummy, 
Conventional=0Co
nservation=1 
Length of agreement The minimum contract 
length they prefer (years) 
LOA 2, 5, 10, 20 Linear 
specification 
Compensation Compensation payments 
(£/ha) 
COMP 10, 25, 50, 75 Linear 
specification 
 
 
 
 
 
A full factorial
2
 design of the CE was not feasible to be used (4
4
+2
2
 = 260) with such a large number 
of combinations; therefore, an orthogonal fractional factorial
3
 design was created using the software 
package Ngene 1.1.1., which resulted in 36 choice sets. Since this is still quite a large amount of 
information to be presented to one respondent, choice sets were then randomly blocked to six sets. 
Each respondent was presented with six choice sets of each payment scheme, each choice set offering 
two policy options along with a ‘do not participate’ alternative. 
 
3.1 Survey design and data collection 
The CE questionnaire helped to gather choice experiment responses along with socioeconomic 
information (including farm-specific, farmer and land management activities) and attitudinal data 
regarding agricultural management activities and climate change.  
The survey was conducted as face to face questionnaires in 2011 and was designed to cover the main 
farm types in the UK which include uphill farms, dairy farms, mixed farms and arable farms. Survey 
locations were strategically selected, spread across Yorkshire, Midlands, Norwich and Scotland. To 
achieve this, the data was collected at farmers’ markets, livestock auction markets, an annual farming 
expo and an annual international dairy and livestock event. This resulted in a total of 380 face to face 
questionnaires from a range of farm types across UK farmlands.   
 
4 Results of CE 
4.1 Mitigation policy results                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Mitigation payment scheme estimations involved 1974 choices elicited from 329 respondents. 
The basic Conditional Logit model (CLM) was specified so that the probability of selecting a 
particular alternative was a function of attributes and the alternative specific constant (ASC), which 
had a value of 1 if the ‘do not want to participate’ option was chosen and 0 if either of the other 
alternatives was chosen. The estimates show (Table 4) that all attributes except the plant generator 
capacity (GCAP) have utility coefficients significant at below 1% level. The results show that 
respondents prefer to have on-farm anaerobic digestion plants with availability of technical 
assistance/training, with short term contracts, and avoiding interference of any power company for the 
plant management. The negative coefficient values for all attributes imply an aversion to undertake 
                                                   
2
 Full factorial design consists of all possible combinations of attributes and levels.  
3
 A fractional factorial design is a sample of the full design, which allows estimation of all the 
relevant effects for the researcher.  
the mitigation options specified; however, the positive and significant compensation attribute shows 
that farmers are more likely to participate when a scheme offers higher compensations other things 
being equal. Interaction terms were also introduced between estimates of the utility parameters and 
farm/farmer characteristics with the choice data in the CLM. The assumption was that this will help to 
explain the effect of socioeconomic characteristics on preferences. The conditional logit interaction 
(CL-int) model was estimated for all the characteristics from the survey data. After extensive testing 
of various interactions with all the farm/farmer characteristics, the variables with significant 
coefficients were found to be farmer’s age (AGE), farm income (FINC), farm size (FSIZE) and 
number of livestock units (LSU). The interactions show that farms with lower farm income have a 
stronger preference for having the AD plant close to the farm than other farmers. It also revealed that 
younger farmers and farms with larger farm size require lower payments per hectare and that farms 
with larger number of livestock units are less averse to longer contracts. Overall the results imply that 
farmers are willing to trade off changes to management and compensation amounts. 
To further account for this heterogeneity in preferences and to divide the respondents into groups with 
similar preferences, the Latent Class (LC) model was estimated. The model for this scenario was 
estimated over 2, 3 and 4 classes; however, the 4 class model did not converge. The log likelihood and 
R
2
 values increased while AIC and BIC decreased from the 2-class to the 3-class model, implying that 
the 3-class provided a better fit. The results as presented in Table 4 reveal that segment-3 was strongly 
associated with 43% of the sample population while segment-1 and segment-2 were associated with 
34% and 23% respectively. The trend as shown in the CL model can still be seen in the LCM, 
however, LCM provided sufficient improvement in predictive capability (R
2
) relative to the basic CL 
and CL-int models to justify this increased complexity. There is a general aversion to most of the 
scheme attributes except for the availability of technical training/assistance and compensation 
amounts. This aversion is stronger in segment-1than the other two segments. The segment-3 farmers, 
however, display a positive response towards most of the attributes and reveal a preference for longer 
contract terms for on-farm anaerobic plants, with the provision of technical assistance.  
Post-hoc analysis of individual-specific segment membership probabilities in the LCM using 
farm/farmer characteristics as individual-specific variables was used to investigate the suggested 
segment association of each individual (Wedel and Kamakura, 2000). Most of the heterogeneity was 
not interpretable from socioeconomic and farm characteristics. However, the estimations (Table 4) 
revealed that farm income, age, and the number of livestock units are the most important determinants 
of segmentation in the sample. There is a higher probability of belonging to segment-1 if farmers have 
a low number of livestock units while segment-2 farmers are mostly in the older age group and with 
low farm incomes. 
 
Table 4: Estimations of CE models for mitigation payment scheme 
Model CLM CLM-
int 
LCM (3 Class)  
Loglikelihood -1615 -1599 -1486  
Pseudo-R2 0.17 0.18 0.31  
AIC 1.64 1.63 1.52  
BIC 1.66 1.66 1.59  
Chi squared   1364  
Degrees of 
freedom 
  23  
 Seg 1 Seg 2 Seg 3 
Attributes Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff 
GCAP -0.000005 -0.000007 -0.0001 -0.0004 *** 0.00005 
DIST -0.0705*** -0.0614*** -0.1300*** -0.2097*** -0.0106 
TECH 0.1287* 0.1255* -0.4455* 1.0529*** 0.2246** 
OWN -0.9058*** -0.4936** -5.9656*** -1.2982*** -0.6068*** 
LOA -0.0322*** -0.0568*** -0.4399*** -0.0292** 0.0301*** 
COMP 0.0295*** 0.0382*** 0.0700*** 0.0271*** 0.0267*** 
ASC -1.2016*** -1.201*** -8.1142*** -0.8734*** -1.2368*** 
AGE*COMP  -0.0003**    
FINC*DIST  -0.000001*    
FSIZE*COMP  0.000042**    
FSIZE*OWN  -0.0031**    
LSU*LOA  0.0001**    
Segment membership parameters 
Constant   0.4581 -2.1775  
Gender   -0.0582 -0.0783  
Ownership   0.1274 0.1117  
Farm income   0.000004 0.0000*  
Farm size   0.00158 -0.0011  
Education   0.0976 0.0425  
Age   0.0054 0.0326**  
Household 
size 
  -0.1263 0.1603  
Livestock 
units 
  -0.0037** -0.0020  
Percentage   34% 23% 42% 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1% and 0.01% respectively 
4.2 Sequestration policy results 
The sequestration scenario included 690 choices from 115 respondents. The results of the 
models estimated for this scenario are discussed below.  
The basic conditional logit (CL) model for farmers’ CE responses provides a modest fit to the 
data (pseudo-R
2
 of 0.20) and suggests that farmers overall show a reluctance towards 
participation in payment schemes which involve drastic changes in their current land use 
practices. The results show that most of the attributes have t-statistics significant at the 0.01% 
level (Table 5). All the attributes except compensation (COMP) have negative coefficient values 
showing the farmers’ reluctance to adopt the proposed changes, and preference to move away 
from the status quo. However, the positive and significant compensation attribute shows that 
farmers are more likely to participate when a scheme offers higher compensations other things 
being equal. The basic CL model did not identify significant preference towards any specific 
attributes also indicated that the basic CL model’s assumptions of identical and independently 
distributed errors are not supported by the data; therefore, a more flexible model for preference 
heterogeneity was required.  
Hence, for further investigations of the heterogeneity in preferences, the Latent Class (LC) 
model was estimated. The model was estimated over 2, 3, and 4 classes; however, the 4-class 
model did not converge. The log-likelihood and R
2
 values increase while the AIC and BIC 
values decrease from the 2-class to the 3-class model, revealing that the 3-class model provided 
a better fit over the 2-class model. The results of the 3-class model  (Table 5) show that for 
segment-1, utility coefficients for conversion to permanent grassland (PER), afforestation 
(AFOR) and compensation (COMP) are the significant attributes at 1% and 5% significance 
level, while for segment-2 all attributes except enrolment for afforestation (AFOR) and length 
of agreement (LOA) are significant. The segment-3 is the largest group with respondents having 
a 47% probability of belonging to this group. This segment shows significant preferences for 
most of the attributes at 0.01% level except the grazing restrictions that were not significant. 
The farmers in segment-2 show higher resistance to participation as compared to the other two 
segments. The results of individual characteristic class probability estimations did not show 
much distinction among the classes, the only variable that proved significant was farm size and 
revealed that farmers with larger farm sizes have a higher probability of belonging to segment-2 
and show aversion to restrictions in land use activities, requiring higher compensation levels for 
uptake of the policy.  
 
 
Table 5: Estimations of CE models for sequestration payment scheme 
Model CLM LCM 
Loglikelihood -594.74 -567.43 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.2 0.25 
AIC 1.744 1.68 
BIC 1.794 1.78 
Chi squared  381.2 
Degrees of 
freedom 
 15 
  Segment  1 Segment 2 Segment 3 
Attributes Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
PGRASS -0.0657*** -0.2718*** -0.0746*** -0.054*** 
AFOR -0.0356*** -0.1156** -0.0034 -0.0423*** 
GRAZ -0.3268** 0.01263 -0.5174** -0.2016 
PLOUGH  -1.1348*** -0.2007 -4.5855*** -0.4517*** 
LOA -0.0201** -0.0446  -0.0146 -0.0313*** 
COMP 0.0162*** 0.0247** 0.0366*** 0.014*** 
ASC -2.5623*** -4.9144*** -3.0081*** -3.1045*** 
Percentage   26% 27% 47% 
         *, **, *** indicate statistic significant at 5%, 1% and 0.01% respectively 
 
4.3 Willingness to Accept (WTA) estimations 
The results of the WTA estimates (Table 6)  for the mitigation scenario show that the highest WTA 
estimates of £85.15 are demonstrated by the members of segment-1 of the LCM for retaining 
ownership over the digestion plant. It was also observed that within each segment the highest WTA 
estimates are for ‘plant ownership’ attribute.  
The sequestration scenario WTA estimates reveal that highest estimates are for segment-2 of the LCM 
at a value of £125.29 for adopting conservation tillage on their farms. The second highest values 
indicate aversion to restrictions on grazing time periods.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Minimum individual WTA (£/ha) estimations for the two payment policy schemes 
Mitigation policy scheme 
Attributes CL LCM (3 segment) 
    Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 
Generator capacity 0.0002 0.0022 0.0171 -0.0019 
Distance 2.39 1.86 7.73 0.40 
Technical 
Assistance/training 
-4.36 6.36 -38.81 -8.38 
Plant Ownership 30.67 85.15 47.85 22.65 
Length of Agreement 1.09 6.28 1.08 -1.12 
Sequestration policy scheme 
Permanent grassland 4.06 11.00 2.04 3.86 
Afforestation 2.20 4.68 0.09 3.02 
Grazing time periods 20.17 -0.51 14.14 14.40 
Ploughing method 70.05 8.13 125.29 32.26 
Length of agreement 1.24 1.81 0.40 2.24 
Negative (-) minimum WTA values mean that the respondents do not require any compensation for adopting the 
suggested changes. 
 
5 Carbon abatement costs 
For the carbon abatement costs, first the two schemes were defined in terms of the measures and 
levels of intensity of measures or changes. The mitigation policy included adoption of a costly 
technology for emissions abatement from livestock manure while sequestration policy involved 
changes in land use management activities such as conversion from arable to grassland, afforestation 
of arable land, restrictive grazing, and conservation ploughing. The two alternative categories for each 
scheme are presented below: 
- MIT_1 (OFAD): On-farm digestion plant with technical assistance, with farmers retaining 
ownership of the plant for a 5 years contract. 
- MIT_2 (CAD): Centralised digestion plant without technical assistance, maintained by a 
power supply company for a 10 years contract. 
- SEQ_1: Enrolling 10% of arable land for conversion to grassland, 2% for afforestation, with 
intensive grazing and conventional tillage on the remaining arable land for a 5 years contract. 
- SEQ _2: Enrolling 30% of arable land for conversion to grassland, 10% for afforestation, 
with extensive grazing and conservation tillage on the remaining arable land for a 10 years 
contract. 
The carbon cost calculations revealed that the sequestration policy has a lower cost of carbon and it 
has a potential to mitigate higher amount of carbon as compared to the mitigation policy. Figure 1 
shows a very steep ascending curve for the adoption of AD plants though the emissions abated across 
farms remains relatively constant. 
 
 
Figure 1 Comparison of cost effectiveness of mitigation and sequestration policy scenarios 
Further investigations of the farmers’ decisions within each policy scheme were conducted by 
considering two alternatives based on the intensity of action for each scheme (Figure 2 a & b) and 
revealed large variations in per hectare required compensations. These results further support the 
findings discussed above as the cost curves for the mitigation policy revealed that MIT-1 (OFAD) is a 
cheaper option to attract farmers for mitigating manure emissions from livestock as compared to 
centralised AD plants. This interest of farmers can be due to the potential benefits associated with the 
OFAD (such as revenue generation and reduction in utility bills for farm and house) and avoidance of 
additional costs of transportation and arranging additional feed-stocks for larger CAD plants.  
A similar pattern was reported for the estimations for the sequestration policy, revealing that SEQ-1 
(the low action alternative) will prove cheaper to implement. However, this cost-effectiveness can be 
achieved only up to a certain level of carbon emissions abatement after which the SEQ-2 (the high 
action alternative) appears to be more cost-effective.  
  
Figure 2 a & b Carbon abatement costs of mitigation and sequestration policy alternatives 
 
Considering the annual costs estimations of both policy schemes the mean yearly costs of 1 tonne of 
carbon were £130 and £40 for mitigation and sequestration schemes respectively. Comparing the 
abatement curves with the DECC and Stern carbon pricing (Table 7) shows that the costs for the 
sequestration policy are more consistent with these costs than the very high values for the mitigation 
policy scenario. The comparison of the carbon costs with the DECC (2009) pricing also revealed that 
approximately half of the sample was within the DECC price range for the overall cost of 
1tCO2e/year. 
 
 
 
Table 7 Carbon pricing (2010 prices) 
Year Stern 550ppm 
emissions 
trajectory 
(£/tCO2e) 
Stern BAU 
emissions 
trajectory 
(£/tCO2e) 
DECC 2009 
(£/tCO2e) 
2004 £25.47 £88.38 £44.69 
2020 £34.96 £121.32 £58.29 
2040 £51.95 £180.28 £131.15 
2060 £77.20 £267.89 £258.41 
 
Overall our cost analysis reveals that schemes using the agroecosystem to sequester carbon can prove 
to be a cost effective  approach for attracting farmers, to achieve the climate change mitigation targets 
through agricultural systems.  
 
6 Discussion  
In this paper we have investigated how farmers trade off changes in land use and land management 
practices required for the provision of climate regulation services. We have explored the potential of 
payment schemes to contribute towards reductions (increases) in emission (carbon sequestration) and 
investigated their uptake by the UK’s farming community. A stated preference approach, Choice 
Experiment (CE) was employed to elicit farmers’ choices for two potential payment policies, 
respectively designed for arable and livestock farming landscapes. Furthermore, cost-effectiveness of 
the two schemes was determined using a marginal abatement cost of carbon (MACC) approach.  
The analysis involved an ex-ante evaluation of farmer uptake based on attributes of the two schemes 
by analysing the impact of different attributes and attribute levels on their participation behaviour. In 
compensation for undertaking the changes the farmers were offered various levels of annual 
payments. A conditional Logit (CL) model and Latent Class model (LCM) were used to analyse the 
data. In common with previous studies (Beharry-Borg et al., 2012; Christensen et al., 2011; Ruto and 
Garrod, 2009) farmers were found to show heterogeneous preferences for different changes in land 
use and land management activities for both scenarios. The results suggest that farmers generally 
show aversion to drastic changes in their land use and land management activities but they can be 
encouraged to adopt some activities by providing the appropriate level of changes and compensation 
incentives. Results of both payment scheme scenarios imply that most farmers would prefer to 
participate in schemes with flexible and less restrictive measures which has also been  suggested by 
Ruto and Garrod (2009) and Wynn et al. (2001). 
For the mitigation payment policy, the results revealed that larger farms and farms with higher 
livestock units prefer OFADs conditional upon the combinations of distance of the plant, availability 
of technical assistance, length of agreement, compensation method and payment per hectare. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the preferred three segments LCM indicated a general aversion to most 
of the attributes except the provision of technical assistance/training. The segment membership 
revealed that segment-1 farmers are the most averse while segment-3 farmers are more willing to 
participate and prefer OFADs with longer contracts. The results also indicated that age, farm size, 
livestock units, and farm income influenced farmers’ participation preferences and displayed that 
younger farmers and farms with larger farm size would require lower compensation payments which 
is in accordance with Ruto and Garrod (2009) and Vanslembrouck et al. (2002) who also found that 
farmers with larger holdings are more likely to participate. Farms with larger numbers of livestock 
units were found to be less averse to longer contracts while low-income farms revealed a stronger 
preference for on-farm AD plants. The WTA was the highest for ownership of the plant, revealing 
that farmers want to retain management control.  
The sequestration payment policy results revealed that farmers are very averse to restrictions on 
grazing time period and adopting conservation tillage which was also affirmed by the WTA estimates, 
however, the socio-economic interactions with the attribute coefficients were unable to provide any 
significant information about the determinants of farmers’ preferences for this policy. 
Furthermore, the carbon costs evaluations revealed that a scheme involving carbon sequestration 
through changes in agroecosystems is cheaper to implement than a scheme based on AD technology. 
This is potentially due to higher associated costs, required skills, and efforts for proper management 
and operation of adopting technologically advanced projects like anaerobic digestion plants. The 
analysis also illustrated that farmers prefer policy schemes which are less intensive in terms of costs 
and effort such as OFADs rather than CADs and also lower level of changes for carbon sequestration 
rather than higher levels.  
The average cost of carbon abatement is comparable to the DECC price (£44.6/tCO2e) but the analysis 
also suggested that half of the population sample was willing to sign up to a scheme at a price below 
or equal to the DECC price. Carbon values for the sequestration policy were more in line with the 
DECC price than the mitigation policy. Therefore, the results suggested that sequestration policy will 
be a more attractive and cost-effective option to be taken up by UK farming community.  
7  Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the limited literature on provision of climate regulation service by UK 
farmlands by utilising a novel approach of combining and comparing (in terms of cost-effectiveness) 
two potential payment schemes for two distinct (arable and livestock) farm types 
Although the study was intended to identify the preference heterogeneity of farmers; most of the 
heterogeneity was not explained by the farm or farmer characteristics. Nonetheless, it is still important 
to know the range of behaviours of farmers when assessing likely uptake of policy schemes for 
enhancing the provision of climate regulation service.  
Methodologically our study shows that CL-int model can provide useful information on main drivers 
of heterogeneity but LCM is required to show a more distinct distribution of that heterogeneity. Even 
though for this study the LCM provided a good representation and clear segmentation of farmers’ 
behaviour; it still was not able to clearly identify preference drivers for the sequestration scenario. 
This is in accordance with (Beharry-Borg et al., 2012) and is potentially attributed to the mixed nature 
of supposedly predominant arable farms.  
The findings presented can be used to address the climate regulation service provided by the UK 
farmlands by designing an attractive and cost-effective scheme for farmers. The study suggests that 
future policies should be based on assessments of the attitudes and behaviour of the farmers, which 
influence their decisions of taking up policy schemes. By considering the heterogeneity of farmers, it 
has been shown that there is a potential of attracting farmers at the lower WTA spectrum by keeping 
some flexibility in the scheme designs. The two identified target groups requiring lower WTA were 
younger farmers and farmers with large farm size.  
This study helped to provide predicted costs of implementing the payment programmes for farmers to 
change their land management practices, to achieve the required climate change abatement. The 
analysis revealed that sequestration policy scheme, which does not have any costs of uptake is 
cheaper to implement. This suggests that policy makers can focus more on schemes for carbon 
sequestration by land use change rather than schemes which involve adoption of technology.   
Future study linking the carbon valuations with spatial (farm and landscape) attributes will be carried 
out, in order to explore the spatial distribution of carbon costs. This regional analysis can help to 
reveal the locations of the target groups i.e. least resistant farmers in terms of carbon costs. 
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